

## THE BOOK REPORT

## CIA Spy Story Takes Long Look at an Invisible Army

BY ROBERT E. KIRSCH

Unlike the older countries of Europe and Asia, the United States has never been overwhelmingly successful at espionage and counter-espionage. As a free nation, isolated for years from the broils and troubles of the Old World, we have not had much motivation in that direction. In our wars, intelligence has either been downgraded or left to amateurs.

All that is ended now. For better or worse, we are now committed to the proposition formulated by Sir Francis Walsingham, the famed spy-master of the Elizabethan period, "Knowledge is never too dear." He meant the knowledge one gains through espionage.

We are spending more money on the Central Intelligence Agency than we have ever spent before. We are learning the methods of espionage and we are contributing new ideas and techniques. Despite some spectacular mistakes we have had some equally spectacular, although naturally not nearly so publicized, successes. You can get the facts in a lucid and interesting piece of reporting, CIA: THE INSIDE STORY (Morrow, \$4.50) by Andrew Tully.

By its very nature, a top-secret espionage organization must operate below the surface. Almost any revelation of its activities such as the U-2 affair and the 1961 invasion of Cuba is bound to call attention to CIA. And this is not a good thing in some ways.

Within the limits of security, Tully relates the history of the CIA, the facts of its operations, the case, the Bay of Pigs inva-

sion, its work in Guatemala, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Suez, Formosa, and Korea.

You will be given a picture of the complexity of its operation, the way it recruits personnel, its not inconsiderable role in counter-espionage in this country, its policy-makers and its agents. Some of this information will reassure you; some of it will shock you. The point is that the CIA batting average is so high that we have rapidly come from the ranks of the amateurs into those of the professionals.

\*

A good part of the story is as exciting as any Ian Fleming novel.

The case of the bent coat hanger is an example of the way tedious research and plotting analysis combines with field work to pay off. A CIA agent in Vienna managed to get a load of trash from a Russian commercial airliner which had landed there. Among the odds and ends, torn magazines, paper napkins, a broken plate, a crust from a cake, was a coat hanger. A few days later, the hanger was analyzed at CIA headquarters. Its metal told us what we wanted to know about a new Soviet long-range bomber.

How? Because one of our agents behind the Iron Curtain learned that the Russians were machining the hanger for use in making a certain kind of bomb. The hanger was in Russian commercial airliners.

We have, it is comforting to know, a great many agents behind the Iron Curtain, on the fringes of the Iron Curtain and in every trouble spot and in every trouble spot in the world. The army, backed by special-

ists and experts, we have been given ample warning in many situations: the CIA alerted John Foster Dulles about the invasion of Suez, the CIA predicted the Chinese intervention in Korea almost to the day, the CIA acted rapidly to support the overthrow of the Communist government of Guatemala.

Tully makes two important points which Americans ought to know and think about. First, because of certain ambiguities in the original policy regarding CIA, it sometimes combines intelligence with policymaking. This was a mistake. The British who have had centuries more experience in this sort of thing separate the two functions clearly.

The second point is that we have to learn how to use information on the policy level. We can't blame the CIA if its intelligence reports are misused or if the channels of information between CIA and appropriate government agencies are clogged up. One hand simply has to know what the other is doing; and the hand which makes policy has to be sure and firm and must take responsibility for its actions. As you will see, the Cuba fiasco is a case in point.

FOIA b3b

COPYRIGHT

COPYRIGHT